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Introduction
This article engages with two contrasting narratives 1 relating to private controls on land use: one in which such controls are seen as an efficient, 'bottom up' means of regulation and another in which they are criticised as typifying an unaccountable, exploitative relation in which ecological interests are subordinated to those of capital. It aims to contribute to debates around the role of private landowners in nature conservation by means of a critical assessment of the Law Commission's 2014 proposals for a new statutory burden on land in England and Wales, the 'conservation covenant'. 2 It is submitted that this can be understood as one manifestation of a form of environmental governance 3 'involving the totality of interactions between public and private actors, and the state no longer playing a central role in decision-making.' 4 By allowing private parties to agree and enforce long-term conservation measures, the conservation covenant could provide new opportunities for participation in conservation activity; the article questions, however, whether the private and voluntary character of the mechanism may jeopardise its ability to deliver the public environmental and social benefits cited as justifications for reform. A central claim of the article is that protection of these public interests requires that more attention be given to questions of environmental justice, in particular to the fair distribution of information and opportunities for participation. More generally, it is suggested that it is difficult to address the social and political dimensions of land-use conflicts adequately within the adjudicative structures associated with private law relationships; caution is therefore required regarding the part that conservation covenants should play in conservation policy.
After outlining the structure of the proposed covenant mechanism, the article positions it within the context of broader moves to create markets in environmental goods and services, for example through the institution of tradeable biodiversity credits in environmental compensation schemes. The potential for the proposals to empower private conservation activity is contrasted with the abstraction and closure that is argued to inhere in commodified private property relations: a private agreement would, by its nature, exclude consideration of a range of social and ecological interests. It is contended that reliance on private initiative could risk the displacement of certain communities from control over 2 which sites are protected and in what manner, raising questions of environmental justice. There is no easy way to reconcile these contradictions, but it is suggested that the potential of the covenant mechanism to enable conservation activity of genuine public benefit would be increased if, rather than approaching covenant creation as solely an exercise of private power, more emphasis were to be placed upon principles of administrative governance such as transparency, accountability and legitimacy.
For this reason, the article asserts that equitable and inclusive public participation could play a limited but crucial role in securing the legitimacy of any future reform, and perhaps also its environmental effectiveness. The penultimate section highlights opportunities for better collection and dissemination of information about covenants and for the involvement of a more diverse range of actors in monitoring and enforcement. If public regulation were to incentivise or require the creation of conservation covenants, effective oversight would be crucial to the legitimacy of the system. Even under an entirely voluntary scheme, greater public engagement would help to ensure that, were conflicts to arise, covenants would be perceived as playing a just and transparent role in the decisionmaking process. The bipolarity of the covenant relationship and the 'agenda-setting' 5 power of the landowner restrict, however, the ability of conservation covenants to serve as a substitute for the public regulation of land use: private agreements are ultimately an unsatisfactory way of determining public conservation priorities. It is concluded that this reflects a more general limit to the ability of property mechanisms to provide environmental justice.
Conservation Covenants: The Law Commission Proposals
Proprietary effect
The terminology used varies across jurisdictions (devices similar to the conservation covenant may be referred to as 'conservation easements', 6 'conservation burdens' 7 or 'conservation servitudes' 8 ), but the Commission's proposals are essentially concerned with the idea of an environmental obligation that can function as a burden on land. According to its Report:
A conservation covenant is an agreement made between a landowner and a conservation body which ensures the conservation of natural or heritage features on the land. It is a private and voluntary arrangement made in the public interest, which continues to be effective even after the land changes hands.
9
The most important feature of a covenant is its ability to provide long term security for environmental benefits through the creation of conservation obligations enforceable against successors in title. 10 These would take effect as a form of statutory burden on land rather than as one of the legal interests in land enumerated in s 1 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 11 Pratt, however, makes a cogent argument that, in the proposed form, a conservation covenant could nevertheless be included within the category of proprietary (as opposed to personal) rights. 12 The main distinction between the proposed mechanism and the existing restrictive freehold covenant is that a conservation covenant
would not require to benefit a dominant parcel of land, it could also include positive obligations that bind successors.
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Given the emphasis placed upon the stability and permanence of the covenant structure, a central challenge faced by any reform is how to combine this with flexibility and responsiveness to environmental and social change. The Law Commission propose that modification or discharge of a covenant could be achieved by application to the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal, who, after having regard to a number of factors including changes to the character of the land and the extent to which the performance of the obligation remains affordable and practicable, would decide on the basis of what is reasonable. 14 Later in the article, it is argued that the legal construction of disputes about covenant modification and discharge as concerning principally the burdened landowner and 4 responsible body may limit the range of public interests that will be considered. 15 A more open and plural process would be better equipped to cope with ecological change and complexity. could also allow offsets to be undertaken outside the area of the local authority in which a damaging development was to take place, something that would be more complicated using existing alternatives such as planning agreements. 53 The Commission proposals exclude for-profit organisations from acting as responsible bodies; 54 there remains, however, the possibility of 'substantial potential commercial application' 55 if future rules were to permit for-profit arrangements (for example in the context of 'payment for eco-system services'). 56 Although not specifically mentioned by the Commission, it seems likely that conservation covenants would be used to protect carbon sequestration activities, which could then give rise to carbon offsets potentially tradeable as credits where appropriate markets exist. The diffusion of power, however, entails a certain amount of risk, which raises important questions regarding ultimate responsibility for the ecological and social consequences of a covenant (or its failure). Even under an entirely voluntary scheme, the role of the state has changed rather than disappearing entirely: the governmental approval of responsible bodies remains a crucial guarantor of legitimacy and suitability. No public oversight of the content of covenants at the point of creation is recommended by the Law Commission, but it is recognised that this could change if covenants were to be used in biodiversity offsetting. 77 There remains a fundamental difference between the public land-use planning system and a system based on private agreements. Particularly over the long term, it might be difficult to ensure that responsible bodies allocate adequate resources to monitoring and enforcement of covenants that they hold. 78 As Korngold notes, the non-profit sector in the United
States is particularly large and well resourced; United States' models of holding and enforcement of easements may not work so well in other jurisdictions. 79 Lack of resources is not, of course, a problem unique to non-governmental bodies but the question of accountability is more difficult. Although 73 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 2.16. There has been insufficient analysis of the long-term costs of holding a covenant compared to owning the land outright: Green Balance Report to the National Trust, The
Potential of Conservation Covenants (2008) 6. In the US, obtaining a conservation easement may cost 70-90% of the cost of purchasing the property outright: Rissman, 'Rethinking' (n 71) 226.
74 Sheila Jasanoff, 'NGOs and the environment: From knowledge to Action' (1997) 18(3) Third World
Quarterly 579, 587. 75 For example, Gunningham cites legitimacy as a benefit of community collaboration: 'Governance' (n 3) 207.
76 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.57. 77 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.100. If covenants were to be imposed as part of the planning process, the local planning authority might play a role in monitoring. information in an uncontroversial way. 90 Ecological and scientific coherence could thus require to be sacrificed in order to produce a covenant agreement that was legally and economically coherent.
Whether or not this view is accepted, there would be both legal and practical reasons 91 to restrict covenant terms to features that were easily observable and measurable. For example, a prohibition on building would be far easier to monitor than a restriction on introduction of non-native species or an injunction to maintain diversity of forest 'stand' age. Indeed, it has been argued to be difficult to protect more complex values using a static, perpetual mechanism.
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The individuation process risks the complex and chaotic nature of biological systems becoming obscured by a focus on discrete elements of ecosystem function. 93 There is a tension between valuation of biodiversity function (which does not obey spatial boundaries and is difficult to separate on any given plot from the function of the landscapes surrounding it) and valuation on an acreage basis (which does not assist in assessing the ecological values of the site in comparison with others). directed at a diffuse, disparate and potentially conflicting public. The traditional structure of a freehold covenant necessitates a relation between two neighbouring pieces of land (the 'touch and concern' rule). 97 The fact that enforcement of such covenants is, at least in theory, embedded in the specificity of the neighbour relation and a community of interests based on proximity and shared amenity preserves some link to the particularity of place. In the case of a conservation covenant, the connection between the responsible body and the burdened land would be of an altogether more nebulous character; although the covenant would require to have a conservation purpose, its terms would not necessarily reflect the full range of purposes and interests that might be relevant. Instead, a particular version of the public interest would be protected by an organisation representing the public.
Environmental Justice Implications
These features have important implications from an environmental justice perspective. Building on the themes of abstraction and displacement, this section argues that the proposed covenant could foster the uneven distribution of ecological risks and benefits. It is beyond the scope of this article to explore the various meanings that may be ascribed to the term 'environmental justice' 98 and its explanatory power compared to alternative concepts such as 'political ecology' 99 or 'ecological justice'. 100 'Environmental justice' is used here in a broad sense to draw attention to the substantive relation between social and economic justice and ecology and the role that exclusion from decisionmaking can play in the production of environmental and social inequalities. Discussion is principally concerned with the fairness of land-use decision-making procedures, but this is arguably related to substantive environmental outcomes. 101 If environmental goods are conceptualised as being a matter 97 'property disciplines both owners and non-owners to become market subjects'.
102
The theoretical possibilities that the proposals offer for individual involvement in environmental governance may obscure the reality that some groups are much better equipped to advance their interests through participation than others. 103 Communities that are already disadvantaged and lacking in social and economic capital would be unlikely to be agents in processes of covenant creation, whether as covenantors or by involvement in the activities of responsible bodies. 104 Indeed, it would be likely to be wealthy landowners of large land parcels who were best placed to benefit from the opportunities offered by conservation covenants, particularly if tax incentives were to be available. 
107
The proposed use of covenants in offsetting has raised fears that development pressures on green spaces will increase, development being 'offset' by the creation or maintenance of natural sites elsewhere which may not be accessible to the same communities (or may not be publicly accessible at all). 108 In such a context, overall ecological function would be prioritised at the expense of the specificity of place; it is argued below that the relatively closed sphere of private law adjudication is not a suitable forum for making this type of sensitive decision.
If conservation covenants were to be used to facilitate the creation of markets in environmental goods and services, there would be a risk that they would simply 'stabilise [the pre-existing] capitalist relations of power and accumulation'. 109 Reliance on private agency does not address the current marginalisation of individuals and groups lacking market power, but appears likely to perpetuate and reproduce existing socio-economic hierarchies. 110 Although the proposed covenant must provide public benefit, the reference to the 'public' does not appear to mean that the benefit is embedded within any particular actual community. Nor is public access to conserved land necessary; 111 a covenant might 'add to the general public wellbeing whether or not the public is able to visit, to observe, or to touch what is being conserved.' 112 As presented in their Report, the Commission proposals seem likely to continue existing patterns of social exclusion.
Improving the governance of the covenant structure6.1 Participation and legitimacy
There is no simple way to resolve these difficulties. One response to the risks associated with commodification would be a comprehensive reorientation of environmental policy. 111 Bray, 'Reconciling' (n 28) 163 refers to public access as creating a 'unique synergy between community involvement and increased conservation value'. However, evidence suggests that the majority of US conservation easements make no provision for public access; see Kay, 'Breaking' (n 57) 12.
112 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 3.22. 215. 114 The continuing relevance of governance issues is recognised by Reid and Nsoh, Privatisation (n 31) para 2.14.
diverse range of actors in monitoring and better access to information would improve any reform introduced. However, the private nature of the mechanism implies that it would be inappropriate for private agreements to play a major role in determining conservation priorities.
Detailed exploration of forms of participation is outwith the scope of this article, 115 but argument here is premised on the view that there is a meaningful distinction between direct involvement by the public in elements of the covenanting process and representation of the community interest by established organisations such as public authorities or large conservation charities. 116 Following
Arnstein's influential conceptualisation of participation as 'redistribution of power', 117 discussion focuses on the extent to which a range of individuals and groups may have meaningful opportunities to influence outcomes. Participation is understood as requiring more than simply co-option into a dominant culture or discourse but rather in a richer sense as opportunity for recognition. 118 The
Commission proposals allow for the public to participate indirectly through involvement with responsible bodies, but the points made earlier about abstraction and displacement emphasise the need for opportunities to participate at a variety of scales and intensities. 119 Although participation is no panacea, 120 it may help, in a small way, to ensure that the presence of multiple, competing interests is made visible.
Covenant creation and agenda setting
Regardless of any efforts that may be made to increase participation, it is submitted that voluntary retain the power to determine covenant content; it would be antithetical to the private and voluntary scheme proposed by the Commission for members of the public to have control over the terms of a covenant. The environmental justice concerns set out above imply that social and political conflict over land uses, which may involve choice between different environmental amenities and public benefits, is unlikely to be resolved equitably by private initiative alone. In the current English law, individual proprietary rights have been argued to exist in the context of a 'socially constituted and dynamic' system of determining land-use rights through administrative processes that generally provide some opportunities for public participation and deliberation. 121 In the longer term, a regime that lacks legitimacy is unlikely to provide the basis for a sustainable land-use policy. sites of special scientific interest and national parks. 126 In Australia, sites protected by covenants have been affected by the exploitation of mineral rights as such rights are owned separately from the rights to use the surface; 127 it would be theoretically possible for this to occur in England. 128 It seems unlikely that the fact that land was protected by a covenant would prevent licenses for unconventional means of energy production and exploration such as hydraulic fracturing being granted. 129 Although in the absence of powers of compulsory extinction 130 a covenant would not be affected by the grant of planning or other regulatory consent in respect of the surface land, this would probably lead to an application for modification or discharge, issues relating to which are discussed below.
Access to information
In order to ensure that land-use conflict was addressed in a democratic and transparent manner, public access to information about covenants and their role in land-use decision-making would be crucial.
Proper and effective monitoring of the effects of any reform requires affected communities to have access to information about the existence of covenants and also monitoring activities. Scientific access to data on covenants would also bring many benefits such as increased understanding of 126 The problem of coordination between the various regimes is raised eg by Reid, 'Privatisation' (n 23) 224-225. In the absence of express legal provision, covenants would be unaffected by existing statutory designations and the possibility of conflict would have to be considered when drafting covenant terms. climate change impacts. 131 Were conservation obligations to be required as mitigation for environmental harms, public scrutiny would be particularly important. 132 There are fears, however that the introduction of conservation covenants could actually weaken public access to environmental information.
133
At a general level, the increased involvement of private actors in environmental protection may negatively affect the way that the public interest in access to information is perceived and implemented. The use of conservation easements in relation to privately owned land in the United
States appears to have fostered concern about privacy, in particular a misapprehension that information about the existence of covenants might lead the public to believe that access rights exist (which would not be the case for some or perhaps many covenants). 134 Rather than nurturing an ethic of community, linking conservation activities to a sphere understood as bounded and protected from outside intrusion diminishes the desire to share information. Framing an issue in terms of the private rights of the landowner focuses debate on protection of privacy interests rather than the collective problem of access to environmental information.
The Law Commission suggest that, in order to be enforceable against successors, covenants should be registered as local land charges on the Land Charges register. 135 It is thought to be impracticable to These proposals do not go far enough. Despite the widespread use of conservation easements in the United States, there is no publicly accessible data showing how exactly how many conservation easements exist or where they are located. 139 There is a disjuncture between the spatial and temporal scales at which easements operate and the scale at which data is collected. 140 The Law Commission refute concerns based on this experience, arguing that, as land-use planning is already locally organised, local registration is consistent with the English policy context. 141 This response does not take sufficient account, however, of the increased need for transparency given the lack of public participation in decision-making about covenants, the fact that there would be a strong public and academic interest in access to national-scale data about how any new mechanism is being used and the risk that important information about the condition and ongoing status of covenant-protected sites would not be collected at all.
It would be especially important that the social and ecological distribution of benefits and burdens be carefully scrutinised if publicly funded incentives were to be offered. The Commission position is that its recommendations should not be regarded as a tax mitigation tool. 142 However, the tax implications of any scheme might only emerge after implementation. Reid identifies potential for reduction of inheritance tax and stamp duty land tax liabilities; 143 it seems likely that there would also be capital gains tax consequences if a covenant were viewed as reducing the value of a property. 141 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 5.78.
142 Covenants (n 2) para 2.5. (these may include land or other forms of heritage such as artworks) made publicly accessible 145 has been criticised for providing inadequate levels of access in return for the funding given. 146 The compulsory collection and dissemination of more extensive information about covenant creation and monitoring would thus be necessary to ensure that any new scheme could be evaluated robustly.
6.4 Accountability and participation in monitoring and enforcement
The need for legitimacy and accountability is additionally crucial to the design of systems for monitoring and enforcement of conservation covenants. There is no guarantee that a covenant would function effectively at all. Enforcement of private agreements by parties who do not hold neighbouring land fundamentally changes the interests involved: enforcement is no longer the private right of a neighbour but the public concern of a conservation organisation or other responsible body.
Entering into new covenants may hold many attractions for conservation bodies, but it is extremely important to ensure that adequate resources are set aside for long-term monitoring and enforcement of agreements. 147 There is a basic asymmetry of information between the occupier of the land and the responsible body; 148 where a large parcel of land is involved, terms such as restrictions on hunting may be difficult or impossible to monitor on a day-to-day basis. 149 In jurisdictions such as Australia where conservation covenants have been widely used, academics have criticised a lack of standardisation in approaches to monitoring and evaluation. 150 It is significant that the proximity requirement that usually applies to restrictive freehold covenants means that monitoring and enforcement will happen almost automatically: if a neighbour's interests are genuinely harmed by breach of a covenant, he or she will usually be aware that this is the case.
However, where the interest enforced is public rather than private the question of monitoring is more complicated. Due to the inadequate provision for information dissemination identified earlier, those geographically close to the land might have no idea of a covenant's existence. Although a large environmental organisation can be assumed to be ideologically committed to adequate enforcement, its interest is of a very different character to the interest of a neighbouring landowner in his or her private amenity and may well require to be balanced against various other organisational concerns and objectives. Enforcement of obligations through the public land-use planning system guarantees at least a minimal degree of transparency and democratic accountability that does not exist in relation to the enforcement of property rights by private bodies.
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If a covenant were to be breached, or its terms disputed, litigation costs could be substantial.
154
Smaller breaches would cause particular difficulties as the financial costs of legal action might often far outweigh the potential benefits. 155 Responsible bodies may, due to political reasons or resource constraints, be unable or unwilling to ensure strict compliance with agreements and the proposed scheme contains no formal system of public oversight. 156 The Law Commission reject the idea of third 151 Fitzsimons and Carr, 'Covenants' (n 150) 611-612. See also A R Rissman and V Butsic, 'Land trust defense and enforcement of conserved areas' (2011) 4 Conservation Letters 31, 35.
152 As Rissman and Sayre argue, the success of any easement will depend not just on the content of the formal legal agreement but on the social relations between benefited party and landowner: 'Outcomes' (n 28). These will be strongly influenced by the individual personalities involved, which may vary if the land is transferred or there is a change of personnel at the relevant responsible body. See also Green Balance, Potential (n 73) 38.
party enforcement because this would be inconsistent with the private and voluntary character of the agreement. 157 However, given the centrality of the public interest in environmental protection to the entire scheme, it is submitted that this argument does not adequately address the concerns that inadequate enforcement may raise. Although the burden of a conservation covenant falls on a private landowner, the benefit is avowedly public and communal. Inclusion of a broader range of actors in the monitoring and enforcement process would enhance the equity, and perhaps also the environmental effectiveness, 158 of the covenant mechanism.
One obvious suggestion is oversight by a state body such as a local authority or a government agency. 159 There is also the possibility of direct enforcement by members of affected local communities. At a basic level, residents could be encouraged to participate in responsible bodies' monitoring activities. This could provide many of the benefits of private involvement identified in part four but would still leave monitoring policy entirely in the control of responsible bodies. A model for an independent power of public intervention might be the power of persons aggrieved by a statutory nuisance to, in summary proceedings, ask for an order requiring the nuisance to be abated and/or prohibiting its recurrence. 160 These schemes would, however, be likely to decrease the willingness of landowners to burden their land with a conservation covenant.
Similar issues arise when determining suitable remedies for breach of a covenant. The private and voluntary nature of the mechanism limits the extent to which a wider range of approaches and sanctions are thought to be appropriate. 161 The remedies recommended by the Law Commission comprise specific performance, injunctive relief and damages (including exemplary damages in appropriate cases), 162 but questions may be raised about how effective such a regime would be in practice in ensuring that a conservation covenant fulfils its stated objectives. The barriers to obtaining 157 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 4.111. The Maine provisions are, however, premised on the inability of the responsible body to take action due to reasons such as bankruptcy or dissolution; the concerns raised here relate not just to inadequacy on the part of a responsible body but to the structure of the covenant mechanism.
27 appropriate relief might include ambiguity in the drafting of the covenant, the need to meet relevant standards of proof and the inadequacy of damages.
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There exists no simple solution but punitive sanctions for landowners who deliberately breach a covenant might be desirable in some circumstances, depending on the seriousness of the harm caused and the presence of, for example, intent to profit fraudulently from it. The risk of fraud would be especially relevant if covenants were used in biodiversity offsetting or carbon sequestration ventures. 164 Although the Commission recommendations allow for exemplary damages, questions can be raised about how appropriate it is to use this mechanism as a sanctions regime. There are strong arguments that any scheme designed to impose sanctions of a punitive nature requires more developed attention to appropriateness of sanction, evidential standards, defences and rights of appeal. 165 
Modification and discharge
The tension between flexibility and permanence 166 raises further questions regarding the ability of a property mechanism to deal with change and conflict in a fair and transparent manner. It is acknowledged by the Commission that the temporal dimension of the covenant structure is problematic: short term goals are undesirable, 167 as these would require regular variation, but environmental change 168 or other political or social factors may mean that any long term obligations quickly become inappropriate or are so vague as to be meaningless. 169 If covenants were to be used to secure compensatory measures in respect of developments causing permanent ecological damage, the conservation value created by the covenant would require to be perpetual but perpetual private ordering in relation to land use is particularly troubling as it restricts the autonomy of future 163 For examples of difficulties in the US and an argument that exemplary damages and criminal sanctions are individuals and communities to determine appropriate land-use patterns. 170 It is unknown what the environmental needs of future generations may be, and whether they would be willing or able to enforce the terms of any particular covenant. 171 It follows from this that the promised perpetuity can only ever be an illusion. 172 Given that biological systems are necessarily continuously adapting and evolving, conservation covenants would require to be drafted with this in mind and their objectives framed to focus on building resilience rather than achieving 'conservation' of a certain state. 173 As Barritt has argued in relation to stewardship obligations, the object of the covenant would then require to be interpreted flexibly in line with the values it is designed to conserve. 174 One suggestion made in the United States has been the use of shorter 'renewable term' easements. 175 These would better reflect a cyclical, rather than a linear, approach to decision-making consistent with adaptive management paradigms. 176 However, this approach could imply a greater commitment to management and monitoring on the part of burdened owners. 177 If a covenant included positive obligations, this would further increase these costs, potentially jeopardising its attraction as a voluntary and flexible mechanism. 178 More expenditure could also be required on enforcement, reducing the perceived efficiency benefits for conservation bodies of the covenant structure compared to outright ownership. 179 Regular amendment 170 See for example J Owley, 'Changing Property in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual and review would add further costs for all parties involved. 180 For this reason, responsible bodies might wish to avoid agreements involving complex management requirements. 181 Alternatively, important provisions could be moved to management plans; these could be even more remote from public scrutiny than covenant terms. 182 The Commission proposals regarding modification and discharge 183 are consistent with the need to respond to environmental and social change. However, they again raise the issue of protection of the public interest in a covenant. One of the factors proposed for consideration is the possibility of substitution of the benefits provided by the covenant for similar benefits under a scheme carried out on other land owned by the burdened party; 184 public trust in covenants would be likely to be eroded if such substitutions took place regularly. Moreover, how would the Lands Chamber take into account any incentives that had been offered to the original covenantor or, in the case of offsetting, the destruction of habitat that had taken place on the strength of the covenant? The circumstances in which the covenant was entered into might be relevant to the 'extent to which the conservation covenant is in the public interest and designed to benefit the public' 185 but the discretion afforded to the Lands Chamber to balance this against other factors and decide that modification or discharge is 'reasonable' seems relatively wide.
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Third parties might also have relied on the existence of the covenant in order to obtain a planning or other benefit; it seems likely that such persons would nevertheless bear no liability to ensure the covenant operated successfully and was appropriately monitored and enforced. 187 There is reflect the conservation objectives embodied in the covenant; any ulterior motivations would be difficult for the Lands Chamber to assess.
188
The Commission reject any further form of oversight, such as a requirement for public consultation, 189 on the basis that this would reduce the flexibility of the system. It is certainly the case that increased participation might make the scheme less attractive to landowners, it would also be difficult to achieve within the structures associated with a private mechanism. Weinrib's exclusion of distributive justice from all private law adjudication, his contention that the structures of private law are poorly equipped to determine policies that affect the public as a whole remains relevant. There is some precedent for consideration of the circumstances in which a restrictive covenant was granted when considering whether it should be modified or discharged, 192 but 188 Korngold et al., 'Modification' (n 168) 31 note that a significant proportion of the easement modifications studied had the potential to decrease conservation values but the process followed was opaque and it was impossible to be sure whether countervailing benefits were gained elsewhere.
189 Law Commission, Covenants (n 2) para 7.31. EWHC 1738 (Ch)) complicate this picture somewhat but arguably a connection between one or more specific persons and the complainant is still necessary for such an order to be enforced. 
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this does not mean that the Lands Chamber is the best forum for this type of dialogue. If the 'persons entitled to the benefit of the covenant' were the general public, it should not be presumed that a responsible body could sufficiently represent all pertinent interests.
Conclusion: Private Means for Public Ends?
Proprietary mechanisms, such as restrictive covenants, are well suited to coordinating private interests. Their tendency towards coherence and certainty plays a valuable role in their justification, in what it means for them to be understood as just. 193 The features that provide this consistency and stability, however, the abstraction from the chaotic realities of the material world and the circumscription of considerations and actors, also make them unsuitable for providing an environmental justice that is plural, participatory and concerned with both human and non-human communities. The Law Commission proposals for the introduction of a conservation covenant, while of great interest to property lawyers, seek to maintain an uneasy balance between public and private that may ultimately be detrimental to the scheme's potential for social and environmental benefit.
It is important to be clear about the strategic objectives of introducing conservation covenants and to identify what such mechanisms could achieve that existing processes cannot. The major question that this article has engaged with is whether covenants can empower private conservation activity while responding in a just manner to the 'public, collective and competing needs' 194 that characterise landuse decision-making. The article has highlighted concerns that an increasing reliance on private actors and markets will advantage a narrow range of social and ecological interests, with significant environmental justice implications. It has focussed on public participation and access to information as means of increasing the inclusiveness and legitimacy of any reform, arguing that involvement of a broader range of actors is necessary to secure the kind of community benefit promised by the Commission proposals.
195
In this respect, the scheme proposed would be enhanced by the addition of opportunities for input by actual communities (rather than the responsible bodies who must be presumed to represent them) into the monitoring and enforcement of the obligations created. Provision for more extensive central 193 One view of the importance of coherence in private law doctrine is that it requires a 'single integrated 
